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The gender pay gap is a key metric of workplace inequity. There is a large and growing 
literature on the gender pay gap, particularly in the U.S., however there is scant documentation 
of internal company practices regarding gender pay equity and company-specific estimates of 
gender pay ratios. (For notable exceptions, see Castilla, 2008 and 2015). Empirical research 
estimating gender pay gaps must typically rely instead on national survey data. While these data 
are rich in individual-level demographic data including educational attainment or family 
composition, they do not include many important explanatory factors of pay such as direct 
measures of performance at work. Standard economic analysis of pay gaps using national survey 
data must instead rely on proxies of on-the-job performance or individual productivity, such 
educational attainment, years in the labor market or sometimes seniority.  
We present a rare case study of one company’s internal pay equity analytics and a point-
in-time estimate of the organization’s gender pay ratio. Using (anonymized) microdata from a 
single firm (within the last five years) with more than 10,000 employees within ten selected 
countries, we estimated within-firm gender pay gaps, controlling for a host of measurable 
employee characteristics. We supplement these quantitative findings with some qualitative 
information about the organization’s associated HR practices for hiring and performance review 
as they relate to compensation.1 We also discuss the control variables chosen for this within-
company gender pay gap analysis vis-à-vis explanatory variables commonly seen in the 
academic literature.  
                                                          
1 It should be noted that we do not address in this paper any purposeful employer practices addressing diversity and 
inclusion, such as employee affinity groups, diversity training or work in support of a culture of diversity. Nor do we 
directly address recruitment, selection or promotion practices.  Our focus is limited to compensation. 
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Access to employee microdata of a single employer allowed us to use control variables 
that more directly measure the explanatory factors of job rank, experience in the company, and 
employee performance than those typically available in national survey data. In addition, we 
were able to place this company’s internal gender equity analysis process within the context of 
its broader HR practices. This case study serves as a launching point to consider differences in 
the framing of the gender pay gap analysis from the academic and employer perspectives and 
identify opportunities for future research that could aid in bridging existing gender pay gap 
literature and equity analysis of single-company employee compensation data.  
Case study of “the Company” 
The subject of this study is a global organization with more than 30,000 employees in at 
least 10 countries.2 We undertook this study to answer the question: “Is the gender pay equity 
analysis used by the Company in line with academic standards for accurately estimating a gender 
pay gap?” Internally, we refer to this as considering whether the company had pay practices that 
were “gender neutral.” 
Employee-level data from ten countries were provided by the Company for the analysis 
presented in this paper. Some of these countries were locations where the Company employed 
larger numbers of employees. Six of these countries are members of the OECD,3 four are located 
in Asia or Africa. All personal identifiers were removed before the data were securely transferred 
from the Company to the authors. The Company data are rich, containing information on 
individual employees such as their gender, age in cohorts, years with the company, ex-Pat status, 
                                                          
2 Our agreement with the Company included our ability to publish academic articles from our findings, but 
stipulated that we protect the organization’s anonymity. To this end, we will refer to the organization as “the 
Company” throughout this paper.  The data used in this project are proprietary and cannot be shared with other 
researchers without the permission of the Company. 
3 The U.S. is not one of the countries included in this analysis. 
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full-time or part-time status, level in the organization, and importantly, a measure of 
performance. Many of these variables are not available in national survey datasets. 
The authors and representatives from the Company met more than a dozen times in 
person or by telephone throughout the project. Representatives of the Company were very 
supportive, answering questions regarding base and variable pay policies, construction of 
specific variables in the dataset, data cleaning routines, and Human Resource (HR) practices that 
may be related to pay.    
With a goal of gender-neutral pay practices, the Company took a proactive approach to 
its HR policies, in particular its gender pay equity analysis but also through other broader and 
complementary policies. In whole, there was a four-pronged continuum of practices that we 
believed could directly impact gender pay equity within the Company. These practices came into 
play at (i) the point of hire, (ii) in the performance review process, (iii) with the annual pay 
increase, and (iv) in the analysis of existing pay outcomes. (See Figure 1.) While it is the fourth 
prong that was the focus of our study, considering the Company’s broader context of policies and 
practices was critical to understanding their workplace approach and interpreting the results of 
the gender equity analysis.4  
First, and at the start of employment, the company had a strong practice of not 
negotiating starting salary offers. As it was explained, the hiring offer was made and if the 
candidate was not satisfied with the offer, the policy was that no negotiation takes place. The 
candidate could always choose not to take the offer and look for employment elsewhere. Starting 
offers were based on objective job criteria which should alleviate the introduction of a gender 
pay gap at hire.  
                                                          
4 Of course, other HR practices can impact this analysis.  For example, if there is inequity by gender in promotion, 
then controlling for job rank in an analysis of pay can lead to misinterpretation of the gender pay gap.  We discuss 
this in more detail below. 
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Next, as employment continues, employees’ performance was reviewed. As we 
understood it, the Company also performed a gender equity analysis of performance review 
scores. If disparities by gender were found in scores awarded by a given manger, “further 
explanation” was sought. The Company believed this process reduced the risk of gender bias in 
performance scores.  
Performance scores were then translated through a formula into pay increases. There was 
no manager discretion on pay increases (once performance scores were set), limiting any 
“performance-reward bias” (Castilla, 2008).  Once an employee was informed of her 
performance score, she should have been able to plug that score into the Company’s pay increase 
formula and precisely compute her annual pay increase.  
Finally, to look for gender pay inequity across its workforce, the Company conducted a 
two-step analysis. Within each country in which it operates, the Company first computed the raw 
gender pay gap (average female wage divided by the average male wage). If the gap between the 
two averages was less than three percent the analysis stopped. (We note below that this practice 
may mask important issues).  If a gap over 3 percent was found, the Company then conducted a 
more robust econometric analysis on the data for that country. If a gap over a certain threshold 
remained after controlling for a set of characteristics, a lump sum was transferred to the 
operations in that country to correct the differences in pay.  
It is important to note that sincere interest was shown by executives of the Company in 
our pursuing this study. Such interest may suggest that the Company was not representative of 
general practices regarding workplace equity analysis and was likely a “leading edge” 
employer.5 While we would caution against generalizing any specific point estimates reported in 
                                                          
5 This assessment of the uniqueness of the Company is based on the authors’ own judgment as objective and 
thorough inventories do not exist of how widespread and robust employer practices are surrounding gender pay gap 
analysis. 
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this article, we believe our study provides value in allowing consideration of the impact that 
using more direct measures of the explanatory factors of pay can have in estimating (perhaps less 
noisy) gender wage gaps, and in bettering the understanding of one employer’s framework for 
analyzing gender pay equity.   
Discrimination in the labor market 
Economists view gender discrimination in the labor market as occurring when “two 
equally qualified individuals are treated differently solely on the basis of their gender” (Blau, 
Ferber and Winkler, 2010, p 193). Gary Becker won the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics in part 
for work on human capital theory and in part for his work on the economics of discrimination 
(1964, 1971). Becker argued that a set of types of discrimination could be based on what he 
called “taste,” where one group may not want to associate or work with another group based on 
some demographic characteristic (e.g. gender, age, or race).6 Customer, employee and employer 
discrimination can all be considered taste-based in that one group effectively pays a higher price 
for something due to a “distaste” for or association with a particular group. For example, in the 
past it might have been common for customers to have preferred that flight attendants be female 
and stock brokers be male. As a result, employers would want to pay male flight attendants and 
female stock brokers less (if hired at all) since presumably customers would demand to pay less 
if served by these groups. Or, if in a particular occupation, men preferred to not work with 
women, the market outcome would be either lower wages for women or occupational 
segregation where men would work in one area and women another, or some blend of both. In 
the case where taste-based discrimination is perpetuated by employers, female employees would 
essentially impose an additional “cost” on the employer equal to the level of the employers’ 
                                                          
6 Parts of this section are based on the straightforward description of labor market discrimination offered by Blau, 
Ferber and Winkler (2010). 
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distaste. By paying female workers less than male workers, the employer would “offset” this 
cost. An interesting point made by Becker (1971) is that in perfectly competitive labor markets, 
taste-based discrimination on behalf of employers would have to disappear under competitive 
pressure for profits. 
An additional form of discrimination (not taste based) discussed in Phelps (1972) and 
Aigner and Cain (1977) is that of statistical discrimination where beliefs (correct or not) about 
the typical member of a group are applied to the entire group. For example, if an employer 
believes that the average female employee is less productive, less attached to the labor force or 
less hard working than the average male employee, and cannot easily evaluate the productivity of 
individuals, she may generalize her belief about the average female employee to all women. This 
would constitute statistical discrimination against women. In today’s parlance, we might call this 
gender profiling. 
Human capital theory, individual pay and productivity  
Human capital theory underpins the economist’s competitive market framing of why 
individuals earn what they do. Individuals bring to the labor market a bundle of human capital 
that includes their educational attainment, experience, innate abilities, etc. (Becker, 1964). Some 
employees have more human capital than others. In a competitive market, where employees are 
paid equal to the value they provide to their employers, it follows that those with more human 
capital will receive higher wages.  
Within this framework, discrimination exists if a pay gap exists between two otherwise 
equally productive individuals. However, in attempting to measure such discriminatory pay gaps, 
individual productivity is rarely known with accuracy. Human capital theory identifies 
characteristics that, if measurable, can be used as proxies for individual productivity. In other 
Please do not cite without permission. 
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words, if education, ability and experience determine an individual’s productivity, knowing these 
human capital characteristics allows one to estimate her productivity. 
In modelling determinants of income, it is recognized that the translation of human 
capital through productivity into earnings occurs within a labor market that is subject to the 
forces of supply and demand. Workplace characteristics affecting the relative bargaining power 
of employees and employers, such as the existence and strength of unions, can also impact the 
level of pay. The combining of these market place filters (industry, occupation, union status, etc.) 
with human capital determined productivity frames the structure of the standard empirical 
analysis of gender pay gaps that is found in the economics literature. 
Raw versus adjusted pay gaps 
It is reasonable to begin considering the size of the gender pay gap by calculating the 
difference in typical (median) earnings of men and women. (See Cain, 1986, or Blau, Ferber and 
Winkler, 2010, for examples). As of the third quarter of 2019, the median usual weekly earnings 
of full-time female workers (16 years and over) in the U.S. was 82.3 percent of that earned by 
full-time male workers (16 years and over), implying a gap of 17.7 percent7 (United States 
Department of Labor, “Usual Weekly Earnings,” 2019). This is termed the raw or unadjusted 
gap, as it does not recognize any differences in the distribution of human capital characteristics 
or market filters that may affect pay, as discussed previously.  
Human capital theory would dictate, however, that this raw gap cannot be interpreted 
solely as discrimination due to gender. For example, one reason women may have lower average 
earnings than men is that, as workers, they are younger on average and there is a well-
                                                          
7 In the U.S., women's-to-men's earnings ratio also varies by race and ethnicity. In the third quarter of 2019, for 
fulltime workers 16 years and over, white women’s median weekly earnings were 82.2 percent of white men’s. The 
ratio for black women relative to black men was 88.9 percent. For Asians and Hispanics, women's-to-men's earnings 
ratio was 83.7 percent and 87.3 percent, respectively. United States Department of Labor, “Usual Weekly Earnings,” 
released October 16, 2019. 
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documented age-earnings profile (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012). Women are also overrepresented 
in lower paying occupations and industries, more likely to work part-time and less likely to be in 
unionized jobs. Any differences in average male and female productivity levels and 
representation across the market filters of industry, occupation, union status, etc., would need to 
be factored out in order to isolate that part of the pay gap left unexplained except for gender. The 
objective of the statistical regression analysis is to remove the effects of explanatory variables 
other than gender and create a statistical comparison of peer men and women who are otherwise 
comparable, on average, in all relevant market filters and productivity (human capital) 
characteristics. The statistically adjusted gender pay gap that results from regression analysis 
(and is regularly smaller than the raw gap) is formally called the “unexplained wage gap.”  
A classic study of the impact that various human capital and market filter factors have the 
on the gender pay gap is Blau and Kahn (2006). They compute a raw gender pay gap (“wage 
differential”) of 20.3 percent and then control for several explanatory factors of pay. (See Figure 
2.) After adjusting for these control variables, 59 percent of the raw gap is “explained,” leaving 
41 percent of the 20.3 percent raw pay gap unexplained – an adjusted gender pay gap of just over 
eight percent between men and women of these same characteristics. Note that some of this 
“unexplained” gap could be discrimination.  At the same time, it may be that it is simply the case 
that other variables (e.g. “productivity”) were not measured in the data sources used. 
Estimating adjusted gender pay gaps using national survey datasets  
To estimate adjusted gender pay gaps, economists most often deploy national survey 
datasets, such as the American Community Survey (ACS), Current Population Survey (CPS), 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
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among others.8 The data accessible through these national survey datasets include detailed 
information on individuals and/or households and can allow for a long list of explanatory factors 
or control variables to be included in regression analysis of the gender pay gap. Controls for 
industry, occupation, union status, race, gender, age, family characteristics and education are 
typical in studies using these data. 
There are limitations to these datasets, however, namely that there is often less 
information than desired about an individual’s employer or job characteristics. And while there 
are datasets that contain survey responses from employers, such as the National Compensation 
Survey, the unit of observation in these surveys is typically the occupation, but not the individual 
employee. It should also be noted that national surveys differ in purpose, resulting in the 
sampling framework and number and definition of variables not being consistent across 
surveys.9 As a result, care must be taken in interpreting any point estimates of pay gaps, as these 
can vary notably across even the most commonly used national survey datasets (Hallock, Jin and 
Barrington, 2014).10 
In terms of estimating gender pay gaps, perhaps the biggest omission from national 
survey datasets is a direct measure of individual-level productivity. Fortunately, human capital 
theory allows for exploitation of the existing and rich data on individuals and/or households to 
                                                          
8 The “Disability and Compensation Variables Catalog” provides a convenient overview of which variables related 
to work and employer characteristics, including compensation such as pay and benefits, are available in these and 
seven other major U.S. national survey datasets. It can be found at 
http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/eprrtc/codebook.cfm.  
9 For example, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) over-samples participants in government 
supplementary income programs because the “main objective of SIPP is to provide accurate and comprehensive 
information about the income and program participation of individuals and households” (Fisher, accessed in 2015). 
See also United States Department of Commerce, http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/about/sipp-
introduction-history.html. 
10  Hallock, Jin and Barrington’s (2014) estimates of the unexplained pay gap between male employees with 
disabilities and their nondisabled peers range from a statistically significant 9.3% using the 2009 ACS to a 
statistically insignificant 3.9% using data from the 2010 CPS with “identical” control variables. 
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proxy the unavailable individual level productivity. For example, since Mincer (1974), 
economists have sometimes controlled for experience, if work history is not known, by 
approximating an employee’s years of work experience as something like [(age) – (years of 
education for highest degree attained) – 6]. Such a computation for a 30 year old college 
graduate would yield: 30 – 16 – 6 = 8. This approximation approach produces a very accurate 
estimate for those who work continuously after (and not during) their years of education, so long 
as the individual is continually working and does not experience spells of non-employment. 
Proxy measures of productivity and computing the unexplained wage gap 
Once the effects of other explanatory variables of pay are controlled for, the residual 
variation in pay attributed to gender—the unexplained gender wage gap—is often attributed to 
discrimination. However, one should use caution in doing so, especially if proxy measures for 
pay determinants have been used in the regression analysis. Any error introduced by less than 
perfect proxies, if correlated with gender, can send a false signal. Consider the commonly used 
[(age) – (years of education for highest degree attained) – 6] proxy for labor market experience. 
This is a good approximation for someone who has had a long-term commitment to the labor 
force and worked continuously after and not during school. To the extent that women, on 
average, are less strongly attached to the labor force over time, such a formulaic approach to 
estimating years of experience will relatively overestimate labor market experience for women. 
If it is the case that men have more labor market experience than women and labor market 
experience is correlated with compensation (both true in national survey data) then estimating 
experience in this form will lead to an overestimation of the unexplained gender wage gap. 
Blau and Kahn (2013) provide an excellent related discussion. They find that including 
“data on actual work histories add considerable explanatory power to wage regressions for 
women, even if they control for potential experience (defined as age minus years of schooling 
Please do not cite without permission. 
13 
 
minus 6, or roughly the number of years that have elapsed since leaving school) and current job 
tenure” (p S21). They write: 
We find that having information on actual full-time and part-time work experience can 
reduce the unexplained gender gap by up to 48% in the PSID (data are for 1990) and 15% 
in the 2008 PDII. Moreover, inclusion of information on actual experience is helpful in 
understanding wage determination of women as well as for analyzing female wage 
inequality. Experience profiles for women are generally found to be much steeper when 
we use actual full-time and part-time experience rather than potential experience. Failure 
to include such data causes us to severely underestimate women’s on-the-job human 
capital accumulation. Moreover, using potential rather than actual experience causes us to 
overstate the increase in women’s residual wage inequality from 1980 to 1999 by about 
20% (pp S26 – S27). 
Through our study of the Company, we add to the existing literature by offering an 
empirical example that is free from reliance on some of the typical proxy variables employed (by 
necessity) in most research analyzing national survey data. Access to micro-level employee data 
of a single corporation allowed us to use control variables that more directly measure the 
explanatory factors of job rank, experience in the company, and employee performance, although 
we did not have all desirable explanatory variables (for example, work experience gained outside 
of the Company).  
Determination of Company pay    
The major differences in our case study of the Company from more typical pay gap 
analyses using national survey data are two-fold. First, the fact that we analyzed one employer, 
and to the extent that employees sort into firms based on quality (see the firm-size wage gap 
literature including Iddson and Oi,1999), differences in employee quality might have already 
Please do not cite without permission. 
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been accounted for through self-selection.11 Second, employee performance scores were 
available to us. Employee performance scores can replace human capital proxies often used as 
controls for productivity in the economics literature. The flow chart in Figure 3 illustrates, from 
an economist’s perspective, a framing for the structure of pay determination within the 
Company, underpinning the gender pay gap analysis we present here.  
At the Company, each employee’s pay is determined by the combination of her 
individual productivity (measured through the performance review process) and market filters 
(benchmarks) integrated into the compensation structure. Using this framing, the Company’s 
continuum of HR practices that supported gender pay equity as previously discussed (Figure 1) 
can be overlain to illustrate their impact along the flow of pay determination. (See Figure 4.)  
Limiting salary negotiation at the point of hire, as the Company reported that they did, 
can have the effect of reducing discretionary and potentially gender-biased deviations from 
otherwise objective market-benchmarked pay levels and may eliminate (or certainly reduce) 
gender differences in interest in negotiating (Babcock and Lasever, 2003). Checking for gender 
bias in performance review scores could have contributed to these scores being an unbiased 
measure of productivity.12 And setting annual pay increases formulaically in addition to 
conducting a gender equity analysis of existing pay outcomes addressed the effectiveness of the 
process meant to translate productivity into pay. 
Gender pay gap estimates within the Company  
Our study focused on assessing whether the gender pay equity analysis used by the 
Company was in line with academic standards for accurately estimating a gender pay gap. Using 
                                                          
11 To impact the gender pay gap, however, the self-selection of workers may need to differ, on average, between 
men and women. 
12 Unless, of course, productivity objectively does differ by gender.  The Company representatives with whom we 
spoke seemed clear that there were no such differences by gender. We see no reason to believe there should be any 
differences at the Company. 
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the Company’s rich dataset, the gender pay gap was estimated using an ordinary least squares 
regression on the log of salary controlling for job rank, time in position, tenure with the 
Company, whether the worker is working full time or part-time and measures of individual 
performance for the current year and two years prior, job rank, as well as demographic controls 
for gender, age, whether the employee is a national of the country in which he or she works, and 
a measure of nationality. The primary empirical specification was the following, estimated 
separately for each of the countries considered:13 
 ln(salaryi) = α + β1 femalei+ β2 nationali + β3 europeani + β4 full timei +  
β5 performancei t + β6 performancei t-1 + β7 performancei t-2 + 
β8 seniorityi + � 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞18
𝑞𝑞=1
 (birth cohort) iq +    � 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞2
8
𝑞𝑞=1
(start cohort) iq +  
+� 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝3
12
𝑝𝑝=1
  (job rank) ip 
where: 
salary is the annualized salary of the individual employee i 
female in an indicator variable equal to 1 if the employee i is female and 0 otherwise 
national is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i is a national of the country being 
modeled and 0 otherwise 
european is equal to 1 if employee i is a national of another European country than the 
country being modeled and is equal to 0 otherwise 
full time is equal to 1 if individual i is working full time and equal to zero otherwise 
performance is a linear term for performance of person i. It is included in the most recent 
year as well as the year prior and the year prior to that and is normalized to have a 
particular mean within workgroup 
seniority is a linear term for the number of years since the last promotion 
birth cohort represents a series of indicator variables equal to 1 for the cohort in which an 
individual is born and equal to zero otherwise 
start cohort represents a series of indicator variables equal to 1 for the cohort in which an 
individual first began at The Company and zero otherwise 
                                                          
13 Regressions were also estimated interacting the control variables with gender and coefficients on female changed 
little. Results are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
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job rank represents a set of twelve indicator variables for the job level or rank in the 
organization in which individual i works. If individual i works in level p then the 
work level p indicator takes a value of 1 and it takes values of 0 otherwise. 
 
The regression coefficients on the variable female were estimated separately for each 
country. These estimates of the unexplained gender pay gap by country are summarized in Table 
1. (See Appendix A for full regression results by country.)   
In two of the six OECD countries analyzed, we estimated statistically significant negative 
coefficients on gender of 5.0 and 5.4 percent. In other words, there was a five and five-plus 
percent disparity in the average pay of male and female employees in these two countries after 
controlling for relevant explanatory factors, including performance. For one OECD country, a 
statistically significant positive coefficient was estimated, showing that, after controlling for the 
explanatory factors included in the model, there was an adjusted or conditional gender pay gap of 
3.2 percent but in favor of female employees. In the remaining three OECD countries and three 
of the four non-OECD countries, the estimated coefficients on gender were not statistically 
significant, implying there was no estimated gender pay inequity among the Company’s 
employees in these countries. In one country in Asia or Africa, an unexplained gender pay gap of 
13 percent for the Company’s Type X employees and 3 percent for its non-Type X employees 
was estimated. Both of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
In line with academic standards? Some discussion 
For the most part, the Company’s gender equity analysis was rigorous and met “academic 
standards.” As with empirical studies in general, some opportunities for possible strengthening of 
the model could be identified. For example, the Company included a 0 or 1 control variable to 
capture whether an employee was a full time worker or not. This means that employees working 
half-time and 80 percent time would be defined identically as “not full time.” The Company’s 
employee database did contain, however, information to define part-time status in finer 
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gradations. As can be seen in Table 2 for operations of the Company in selected OECD 
countries, using a less restricted measure of part-time hours did generally increase the gender pay 
gap estimate due to the greater likelihood that women were part-time workers. We recommended 
continuing use of this measure as in general it is prudent to not put more structure on a variable 
than is necessary.14 
The more interesting considerations involve inclusion of control variables that 
economists expect to see in pay gap regressions, in part due to the need to proxying of 
productivity. Here, we explicitly discuss education, lifetime labor market experience, and race, 
along with the performance measure. Our discussion with the Company over these explanatory 
variables proved illuminating of the different perspectives of and data available to academic 
economists and employers, and revealed some opportunities for future research.    
Education 
As noted in the earlier discussion of human capital, education is very highly correlated 
with labor market earnings. This has been documented across countries and over time (Becker, 
1967, Mincer, 1974 and Card, 2001). The Company, however, did not control for education in 
any of its statistical analysis of gender neutrality in pay practices. This created a problem if the 
employees of the Company differed in their levels of education by gender and if compensation in 
the Company was also correlated with education distinct from its correlation with job rank or 
performance (which are controlled for). There is evidence in the academic literature and in 
practice that education matters for wages even within job categories. However, if this evidence is 
                                                          
14 Another example of an overly complicated specification being used by the company was found in the dependent 
pay variable. The Company had defined the left-hand variable in a manner that aligned with the Company’s use of 
pay ranges in its compensation structure, but which introduced more structure into the measure of pay than was 
ideal. The measure was also less intuitive than the natural log of salary used throughout the analysis presented in this 
paper, making it more difficult to explain the equity analysis results to Company managers and executives outside 
the compensation function. Changing the definition of the dependent variable to the natural log of pay aligns better 
with standard academic practice and interpretation, and resulted in little change in the estimated gender coefficients. 
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underpinned by analysis in which education is a proxy for performance, and if performance can 
be measured directly (and accurately), then omitting education as an explanatory variable should 
not present misspecification concerns. In other words, if the output of productivity can be 
measured directly, objectively and accurately then input measures to that productivity, such as 
education, are not necessary as a proxy. 
We discussed with representatives from the Company the exclusion of education as a 
right-hand variable. The Company’s explanation for why they did not include education as an 
explanatory factor was exactly this measuring-outputs logic, although their language was 
different. They stated that a certain level of education is required to be hired or promoted into a 
particular position in the Company. If one has achieved that level of education, she/he could be 
eligible for the job. Without the necessary level of education, the person could not be considered 
for the job. According to the Company, their practice was that education is only a requirement 
for access to a job, not a criterion considered in any pay decision. Pay increases were not made to 
reward an employee for completing additional education after hire. In other words, no 
compensation differentials were paid for additional education at the Company.15 Furthermore, 
the Company believed that actual productivity was captured by the performance metric included 
in the analysis and it was that performance measure that was directly translated into pay 
increases. If this were the case – that no direct reward was paid for additional education and 
performance scores captured true productivity, then the exclusion of education should not have 
introduced mismeasurement of the gender pay gap and education was not needed as a proxy for 
productivity. If education level of employees were added to the dataset then further empirical 
                                                          
15 This practice of the Company is in contrast to what is described as a “pay-for-knowledge” system in the literature 
(Milkovich, Newman and Gerhart, 2014).  A pay-for-knowledge plan would “pay employees more for learning a 
variety of different jobs or skills” (p 527).  
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analysis could test if including education as a control variable along with performance is indeed 
redundant. But note that the company was assuming that they measured productivity correctly. 
 
Experience 
Labor market experience is an important correlate of compensation. As referenced 
earlier, the literature includes discussion of measuring experience when precise measures are not 
available, as in large national survey datasets, and the resulting potential for measurement error. 
In the case of estimating the gender pay gap within the Company, the employee data used by the 
company included measures of experience within a particular job or position (seniority reports 
years since last promotion) and tenure at the Company (start cohort measures time since 
employee joined the Company). These measures are valuable measures of experience within the 
company itself, which could be considered company-specific human capital. They did not, 
however, capture total labor market experience, which would have included time worked outside 
of the present organization.  
To what degree did controlling for within-Company experience create mismeasurement 
and could estimating total labor market experience with the common approximation of [(age) – 
(years of education) – 6] have added explanatory power? It depends in part on the differences in 
experience gained by men and women respectively. For employees who took no break from 
work and joined the company directly after finishing their education, the in-Company experience 
measure we used and the common [(age) – (years of education) – 6] proxy would have been 
identical. Also, if the length and type of work experience that men and women gained prior to 
joining the Company did not differ in the value it contributes to their current performance, there 
would have been no disadvantage in controlling for in-Company experience only. However, if 
women’s pre-Company work experience were, for example, less relevant to (or correlated with) 
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performance in their current job than it were for men (either because it was shorter or less 
directly applicable), then either measure could have mismeasured actual (relevant) experience, 
and the size of that relative mismeasurement would depend on how large the relevance gap of 
pre-Company experience was between male and female employees.   
In either case, within the human capital framework, if performance were fully capturing 
productivity, experience would have been an unnecessary control variable. The significance of 
these variables in our Company regressions would suggest that pay was determined by some 
function of tenure, not performance scores alone. 
Better testing of the effectiveness of experience vis-à-vis the performance score as 
measures of productivity and determinants of income, along with the value of including 
additional and common human capital characteristics, is worth exploring in future research. 
Race and ethnicity 
Race is correlated with compensation in the U.S. labor market, as has been carefully 
documented by a great deal of research (Cain, 1986). Additionally, due to regulatory 
requirements and cultural norms, many organizations in the U.S. are as concerned with race 
neutrality in compensation as they are with gender neutrality. For these reasons, controlling for 
race and ethnicity is expected in pay analyses on U.S. national data sources. 
In countries where the Company operates, however, organizations may be barred from 
collecting information on the race of employees. Because of this, the company did not include 
race as a variable in its gender pay equity analysis and did not have that data compiled for these 
countries. The Company did, however, record employee nationality. There was concern on the 
part of the Company that bias in favor or Europeans and/or those working in their home 
countries could have created its own inequity in pay and therefore explanatory variables to 
identify this possible bias were also included in the pay equity regression. 
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Performance measures of productivity 
The assumption that individual performance scores accurately captured productivity 
underpins the Company’s gender pay equity analysis and the empirical results presented in Table 
1. To the extent that group, team or division performance contributed to productivity in a manner 
not captured by the individual performance measure (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and this 
missing measure was correlated with gender, mismeasurement of the true gender pay gap could 
have resulted. Ideally, further measures would be collected to capture productivity resulting from 
any joint-production factors. 
Potential endogeneity presented another concern regarding the validity of the 
performance measure. Because Company managers understood that any merit or bonus pay 
increase was determined strictly by the performance score, a manager wishing to pay an 
employee more would know what performance score she needed give the employee to make this 
happen. If this scenario accurately represented a common behavior among managers, the desired 
pay increase would have become an explanatory factor of the performance score.16  
As mentioned above, we were informed by the Company that a separate test for gender 
neutrality of performance scores was conducted. While the specifics of this test process were not 
made fully clear to us, our understanding was that performance scores awarded by all managers 
were reviewed for gender disparities. If such a disparity were identified in the scores of a 
particular manager, “further explanation” was requested. To the degree that this process did 
eliminate gender bias in performance scores, any endogeneity in performance scores that did 
                                                          
16 In his field study of a large private company, Castilla (2015) finds no significant shift in the distribution of 
performance ratings by demographic characteristics following the introduction of greater organizational 
accountability and transparency into the pay determination process. 
Please do not cite without permission. 
22 
 
exist should not have a gender component. Future research could be conducted to test for such 
endogeneity, as well as to determine whether any gender disparities in performance scores exist. 
An interesting variable that was collected by the Company but not used in the statistical 
analyses of pay neutrality is “potential score.” If this was a neutral and objective measure of 
potential, it could have provided a valuable additional measure in a study of gender pay neutrality. 
If one’s potential is high, additional pay may be warranted for retention purposes. If gender 
imbalance exists in the population of employees identified as high-potentials and retention bonuses 
are paid, this measure should be included in the equity analysis. If, however, being a high potential 
does not translate into pay increases beyond that determined by the current performance score, then 
this measure should not have any explanatory power in the gender pay gap regression. Additional 
analyses to investigate the explanatory power of this measure could be considered in future work. 
Occupational segregation: beyond the pay gap analysis  
A further observation from our case study related to the relationship between gender pay 
equity and overall workplace equality. Analyzing compensation for gender inequity per se 
doesn’t reflect or inform on overall equality in the workplace, specifically in terms of 
occupational representation. Gender pay equity means simply that employees get paid the same 
if they are doing the same job equally well, regardless of their gender. Overall equality means 
that there is no difference by gender in who is doing what jobs or the pay they are receiving. For 
the ten countries analyzed in this case study, notable clustering of women by job rank was 
observed in the data, consistent with labor market patterns at-large in countries across the globe.  
The issue of the occupational or job rank distribution is very important in considering 
gender pay neutrality. The reason is plain to see: as mentioned earlier, if female employees are 
distributed in lower paying positions and an analysis “controls” for position held then gender 
differences in overall compensation equality could be masked. This is not to suggest that it is 
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inappropriate to control for occupation. Rather, this is meant to highlight this incredibly 
important issue in any analysis of gender compensation neutrality.  
Within the Company, the fraction of employees within each job rank that were female 
varied dramatically. For example, among employees in the lowest job rank, 68 percent were 
women in Country A, while roughly 10 percent of those in the highest rank were women. To 
summarize the distribution of female employees across job rank within country, an index of 
dissimilarity, or job rank segregation, was computed (see Table 3) using the following simple 
equation:  
  D = ½ ∑ |𝑘𝑘1 x i – y i| 
where  
xi is the percentage of all male employees in a given country employed in job rank i  
yi is the percentage of all female employees in that country employed in job rank i.  
 
This dissimilarity index is often referred to as the Duncan Index (Duncan and Duncan, 
1955). It can be interpreted as the proportion of female employees in the country who would 
have to change job rank in order to spread the female representation evenly across all job ranks, 
or have the proportion of women in each job rank equal to the proportion of female employees in 
the country overall (p 211). 
The index values computed ranged from a low of 5 within Country H for Type X 
employees to a high of 33 in Country F. This job rank segregation is important to note. We found 
that, controlling for a variety of factors including importantly job rank, there was little measured 
difference in the pay of men and women. But such controls can obviously mask bias or 
discrimination in promotion or hire. 
There are many reasons why women may be more likely in some job ranks of an 
organization rather than another (or in some jobs such as Type X jobs). Among them could be 
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societal reasons, taste differences or discrimination. Some have argued that there may be 
“feedback effects” (Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 2010), where if women feel that they may be 
discriminated against they may be less likely to invest in human capital in the first place. The 
level and variation of the dissimilarity indexes for the Company across the selected ten countries 
suggests that an important next step for the Company was to more carefully investigate the hiring 
and promotion practices within each country and across the organization to be sure that these 
practices were gender neutral as well. An organization cannot truly know about the gender 
neutrality of its pay practices in the absence of a holistic analysis of balanced treatment by 
gender throughout its human resource systems. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that the Company’s statistical analysis was on par with academic standards 
in most respects. As with any empirical analysis, there is always room for considering additional 
information, alternative modeling or future research; but, in general, the Company’s proactive 
efforts to test the gender neutrality of its pay practices should be considered a promising practice 
for others to emulate. In addition, what we understand of the Company’s broader HR practices 
that limited discretionary control of its hiring and supervising managers in determining pay 
suggests that having supporting structures in place across the organization that work toward 
gender equity in the workplace overall is important. In this regard, our results align with Castilla 
(2015), who concludes from his longitudinal case study analysis “that the introduction of certain 
organizational accountability and transparency procedures into pay decisions is associated with a 
reduction in the observed pay gap” (p 328).  
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Figure 1  The Company’s continuum of HR practices supporting gender pay equity  
 
 
Figure 2  Contribution of Measured Characteristics in Explaining Gender Pay Gap 
 
Chart constructed from Table 7-1 in Blau, Francine, Marianne Ferber and Anne Winkler, 2010, The 
Economics of Women, Men and Work, Prentice-Hall, 6th ed., page 196. 
 
 
Figure 3  Framing of Pay Determination in the Company 
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Figure 4  Junctures where company’s HR practices check pay determination 
  
 
Table 1 Unexplained Gender Wage Gap Estimates.  
   Coefficient on (female) Across Countries  
Countries in 
OECD 
Coefficient on 
female 
Countries in 
Asia or Africa 
Coefficient on 
female 
A - 0.050*** (0.004) G 
- 0.002   
   (0.006) 
B 0.032*** (0.007) H (nonType X) 
    0.007 
    (0.009) 
C - 0.054*** (0.003) H (Type X) 
     - 0.007 
    (0.011) 
D 0.017 (0.021) I (nonType X) 
       - 0.030*** 
  (0.007) 
E - 0.006 (0.020) I (Type X) 
      - 0.130*** 
  (0.016) 
F - 0.005 (0.012) J 
  - 0.0004 
   (0.003) 
 
The coefficient estimates on the female indictor variable in log salary regressions are reported, controlling 
also for national, european, full time, performance, seniority, birth cohort, start cohort, job rank. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Type X denotes specific sets of locations where employees are doing very similar work in a specific 
context.  In countries H and I, the firm had these locations and felt it important to do the analysis separately 
in those locations. Regressions were also estimated with interaction terms. Little change occurred in the 
coefficient female. Results are not presented here, but are available. 
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Table 2  Gender Wage Gap Estimates with Alternative Measure of Part-time 
Countries in 
OECD 
Coefficient on female 
Part-time VS  
Full time 
Refined  
Part-time VS Full time 
(0-20%, 20-40%,  
… 80-100%) 
A - 0.050*** (0.004) 
- 0.060*** 
(0.004) 
B 0.032*** (0.007) 
- 0.006  
(0.006) 
C - 0.054*** (0.003) 
- 0.075*** 
(0.002) 
D 0.017 (0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
E - 0.006 (0.020) 
- 0.012 
(0.013) 
F - 0.005 (0.012) 
- 0.013 
(0.012) 
 
Column 2 reports the coefficient estimates on the female indictor variable in log salary regressions, 
controlling also for national, european, full time, performance, seniority, birth cohort, start cohort, job rank. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
Column 3 is created by using all the same control specifications as in earlier regressions but replacing the 
Part-time variable with five indicators to capture varying degrees of time worked 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 
60-80%, and 80-100%. 
 
Table 3   Index of Job Rank Segregation within Country 
Countries in 
OECD 
Index of Rank 
Segregation 
Countries in Asia      
or Africa 
Index of Rank 
Segregation 
A 17 G .14 
B 12 H (nonType X) 18 
C 12 H (Type X) 5 
D 23 I (nonType X) 16 
E 18 I (Type X) 17 
F 33 J 20 
 
The indexes are computed for 12 job ranks, except for one, Country F, which uses more job ranks. Type X 
denotes specific locations where employees are doing very similar work in a specific context.  In countries 
H and I, the firm had such operations and felt it important to do the analysis separately in those locations.   
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Appendix A.   
Basic Specifications: Dependent Variable = Natural Logarithm of Salary 
 
Country A.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.295*** -0.240*** -0.267*** -0.198*** -0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) 
National  -0.000 -0.039 -0.161*** -0.014 
  (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.009) 
European  0.023 -0.006 -0.047 -0.028** 
  (0.036) (0.042) (0.038) (0.012) 
Full time  0.341*** 0.358*** 0.390*** 0.286*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.007) 
Performance   0.069 0.208*** 0.126*** 
   (0.053) (0.048) (0.016) 
Performancet-1   0.065 0.139*** -0.011 
   (0.055) (0.050) (0.017) 
Performancet-2   0.507*** 0.395*** 0.076*** 
   (0.048) (0.044) (0.016) 
Seniority    -0.044** -0.045*** 
    (0.019) (0.006) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.120 0.184 0.340 0.928 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
5000 < N < 10000 employees. 
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Country B.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female  -0.150*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.006 0.032*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) 
National  0.210*** 0.146** 0.082 0.065** 
  (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.030) 
European  0.159*** 0.122* 0.111* 0.071** 
  (0.060) (0.067) (0.063) (0.034) 
Full time  0.541*** 0.548*** 0.573*** 0.548*** 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) 
Performance   -0.008 0.043 0.044* 
   (0.048) (0.045) (0.024) 
Performancet-1   0.031 0.109** 0.039 
   (0.052) (0.050) (0.027) 
Performancet-2   0.306*** 0.269*** 0.126*** 
   (0.044) (0.042) (0.022) 
Seniority    -0.048** -0.047*** 
    (0.014) (0.007) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.367 0.442 0.500 0.861 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
1000 < N < 2500 employees. 
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Country C.       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.289*** -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.130*** -0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) 
National  0.074*** 0.028 -0.076*** -0.016** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.007) 
European  0.021 0.026 -0.006 -0.002 
  (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.008) 
Full time  0.296*** 0.311*** 0.323*** 0.240*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) 
Performance   0.034 0.113*** 0.052*** 
   (0.040) (0.038) (0.009) 
Performancet-1   0.024 0.062*** 0.063*** 
   (0.042) (0.040) (0.009) 
Performancet-2   0.290*** 0.305*** 0.036*** 
   (0.038) (0.035) (0.009) 
Seniority    -0.038** -0.026*** 
    (0.009) (0.002) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.119 0.139 0.241 0.954 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
5000 < N < 10000 employees. 
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Country D.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.235*** -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.087** 0.017 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.021) 
National  -0.045 -0.065 -0.084 -0.001 
  (0.052) (0.062) (0.060) (0.032) 
European      
 
Full time 0.435***  
(0.067) 
0.434*** 
 (0.070) 
0.529***  
(0.069) 
0.442***  
(0.036) 
Performance   0.170 0.171 -0.045*** 
   (0.121) (0.117) (0.062) 
Performancet-1   0.030 0.0004 0.123* 
   (0.124) (0.118) (0.063) 
Performancet-2   0.178* 0.249** 0.080 
   (0.105) (0.102) (0.054) 
Seniority    -0.023* -0.032*** 
    (0.019) (0.006) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.189 0.229 0.312 0.814 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
100 < N < 500 employees. 
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Country E.      
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.166*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.096** -0.006 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.020) 
National  0.273 -0.329*   
  (0.306) (0.178)   
European  0.645*  0.275 0.026 
  (0.354)  (0.174) (0.083) 
Full time  0.618*** 0.640*** 0.671*** 0.543*** 
  (0.089) (0.096) (0.096) (0.044) 
Performance   -0.078 0.051 0.036 
   (0.163) (0.161) (0.073) 
Performancet-1   0.085 0.129 0.025 
   (0.157) (0.153) (0.070) 
Performancet-2   0.274* 0.243 0.201*** 
   (0.152) (0.151) (0.069) 
Seniority    -0.130*** -0.106*** 
    (0.046) (0.021) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.200 0.254 0.314 0.859 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
European dropped due to collinearity in (3), “National” dropped due to collinearity in (4) and (5). 
 
100 < N < 500 employees. 
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Country F.       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.205*** -0.197*** -0.195*** -0.151*** -0.005 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.012) 
National  0.179 -0.159 -0.011 0.024 
  (0.178) (0.193) (0.189) (0.047) 
European  0.098 0.097 -0.037 0.058 
  (0.217) (0.231) (0.226) (0.056) 
Full time  0.082 0.088 0.136 0.171*** 
  (0.105) (0.118) (0.114) (0.028) 
Performance   0.218 0.293* 0.051 
   (0.165) (0.159) (0.040) 
Performancet-1   -0.192 -0.060 0.035 
   (0.186) (0.180) (0.045) 
Performancet-2   0.331** 0.355** 0.015 
   (0.150) (0.146) (0.038) 
Seniority    -0.078 0.060** 
    (0.103) (0.026) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.046 0.063 0.143 0.949 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
100 < N < 500 employees. 
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Country G.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.039 0.020 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.006) 
National  -0.015 -0.071** -0.087*** -0.0002 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.007) 
European      
 
Full time 0.037 -0.025 0.037 0.224*** 
(0.156) (0.167) (0.159) (0.040) 
Performance   -0.042 0.035 0.023 
   (0.093) (0.090) (0.022) 
Performancet-1   -0.006 0.139 0.033 
   (0.102) (0.099) (0.025) 
Performancet-2   0.372*** 0.359*** 0.047** 
   (0.098) (0.093) (0.024) 
Seniority    0.034*** -0.015*** 
    (0.013) (0.003) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.008 0.016 0.109 0.945 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
1000 < N < 2500 employees. 
  
 38 
 
Country H.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.574*** 
(0.028) 
-0.574***  
(0.028) 
-0.753***  
(0.039) 
-0.247***  
(0.032) 
-0.092***  
(0.017) 
National  0.280 0.272 0.367 0.079 
  (0.206) (0.319) (0.232) (0.122) 
European      
 
  Full time -0.017 
     (0.524) 
 
Performance   -0.247 0.239** -0.062 
   (0.153) (0.112) (0.059) 
Performancet-1   0.043 0.353*** 0.025 
   (0.158) (0.115) (0.061) 
Performancet-2   1.013*** 0.695*** 0.008 
   (0.116) (0.084) (0.046) 
Seniority    0.010 -0.033*** 
    (0.016) (0.009) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.123 0.254 0.610 0.892 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
Fulltime is dropped due to collinearity in specifications (3)-(5). 
 
1000 < N < 3500 employees. 
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Country H. 
(Type X) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Female -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.229*** -0.165*** -0.007  
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.046) (0.036) (0.011)  
National  0.027 0.073 0.127 -0.027  
  (0.131) (0.260) (0.200) (0.059)  
European       
 
  Fulltime 0.448 
 (0.451) 
Performance   -0.186 0.092 -0.011 
   (0.157) (0.122) (0.036) 
Performancet-1   0.162 0.259** 0.009 
   (0.158) (0.122) (0.037) 
Performancet-2   0.777*** 0.582*** 0.046* 
   (0.112) (0.087) (0.027) 
Seniority    -0.221** 0.924*** 
    (0.092) (0.155) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.004 0.103 0.471 0.954 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
Full time omitted because of collinearity in (3)-(5). 
 
500 < N < 2500 employees. 
 
In this country, the firm had operations where the bulk of employees are doing very similar work 
in a specific context, denoted here as Type X employees. The Company felt it important to 
analyze separately Type X employees and non-Type X employees in these locations.  
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Country H. 
(non-Type X) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.279*** -0.278*** -0.280*** -0.050 0.007 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.009) 
National  -0.468 -0.272 -0.322 -0.439*** 
  (0.534) (0.465) (0.389) (0.102) 
European      
 
  Full time 0.152 
     (0.534) 
Performance   0.060 0.322*** 0.005 
   (0.142) (0.118) (0.031) 
Performancet-1   0.226 0.408*** 0.086*** 
   (0.149) (0.123) (0.033) 
Performancet-2   0.585*** 0.550*** 0.062** 
   (0.116) (0.095) (0.026) 
Seniority    -0.031** -0.042*** 
    (0.012) (0.003) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.055 0.116 0.413 0.960 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
Full time omitted due to collinearity in (3)-(5). 
 
500 < N < 1000 employees. 
 
In this country, the firm had operations where the bulk of employees are doing very similar work 
in a specific context, denoted here as Type X employees. The Company felt it important to 
analyze separately Type X employees and non-Type X employees in these locations.  
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Country I.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.478*** 
(0.018) 
-0.454***  
(0.018) 
-0.385***  
(0.018) 
-0.230***  
(0.017) 
-0.088***  
(0.008) 
National  -0.587***  
(0.044) 
-0.394***  
(0.047) 
-0.349***  
(0.042) 
-0.285***  
(0.019) 
European      
 
Full time  -0.061 -0.070 -0.083 0.132 
  (0.423) (0.375) (0.328) (0.150) 
Performance   -0.081 0.135** -0.008 
   (0.076) (0.067) (0.031) 
Performancet-1   0.067 0.194*** 0.063* 
   (0.081) (0.071) (0.033) 
Performancet-2   0.472*** 0.407*** 0.079*** 
   (0.071) (0.062) (0.029) 
Seniority    -0.012 -0.041*** 
    (0.007) (0.003) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.160 0.143 0.346 0.863 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
1000 < N < 5000 employees. 
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Country I. 
(Type X) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.376***  
(0.034) 
-0.372***  
(0.035) 
-0.392***  
(0.040) 
-0.238***  
(0.034) 
-0.130***  
(0.016) 
National  -0.119 -0.157 -0.109 -0.150*** 
  (0.090) (0.120) (0.100) (0.047) 
European      
  Full time 
  Performance 
 
Performancet-1   0.090 0.210 0.004 
   (0.165) (0.137) (0.064) 
Performancet-2   0.686*** 0.689*** 0.010 
   (0.144) (0.119) (0.057) 
Seniority    -0.200*** -0.363*** 
    (0.047) (0.023) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.080 0.123 0.404 0.869 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
Full time omitted because of collinearity in (2)-(5). 
500 < N < 1500 employees. 
In this country, the firm had operations where the bulk of employees are doing very similar work 
in a specific context, denoted here as Type X employees. The Company felt it important to 
analyze separately Type X employees and non-Type X employees in these locations.  
0.057 0.259** 0.005 
(0.158) (0.131) (0.062) 
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Country I. 
(non-Type X) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.286*** 
(0.020) 
-0.250***  
(0.020) 
-0.238***  
(0.020) 
-0.135***  
(0.018) 
-0.030***  
(0.007) 
National  -0.766***  
(0.043) 
-0.435***  
(0.046) 
-0.366***  
(0.042) 
-0.314***  
(0.016) 
European      
 
Full time  0.317 0.172 0.136 0.227** 
  (0.358) (0.332) (0.297) (0.115) 
Performance   -0.075 0.104 -0.005 
   (0.080) (0.072) (0.028) 
Performancet-1   -0.015 0.111 0.018 
   (0.086) (0.077) (0.030) 
Performancet-2   0.361*** 0.313*** 0.065** 
   (0.075) (0.068) (0.026) 
Seniority    -0.015** -0.036*** 
    (0.007) (0.003) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.140 0.093 0.276 0.892 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
1000 < N < 3500 employees. 
 
In this country, the firm had operations where the bulk of employees are doing very similar work 
in a specific context, denoted here as Type X employees. The Company felt it important to 
analyze separately Type X employees and non-Type X employees in these locations.  
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Country J.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.197*** -0.201*** -0.190*** -0.101*** -0.0004 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.003) 
National  -0.344**  
(0.136) 
-0.405**  
(0.165) 
-0.516***  
(0.135) 
-0.136***  
(0.026) 
European      
 
   Full time 
   Performance 
 
Performancet-1   0.206*** 0.230 0.027 
   (0.060) (0.048) (0.009) 
Performancet-2   0.404*** 0.340 0.017** 
   (0.053) (0.043) (0.008) 
Seniority    -0.039 -0.139*** 
    (0.043) (0.009) 
Birth Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Start Cohorts No No No Yes Yes 
Job ranks No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.030 0.055 0.372 0.976 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicated significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
Full time is omitted since perfectly collinear with other variables. 
 
1000 < N < 5000 employees. 
-0.185*** 0.056 0.082*** 
(0.065) (0.054) (0.011) 
 
